



STATEMENT OF  
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UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND



BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

MARCH 3, 1998

## INTRODUCTION

*“...the fundamental challenge facing the Defense Department, indeed the nation, is to continue to meet the challenges of shaping the security environment and responding to the full range of crises in the near term while at the same time transforming our forces and capabilities to meet the demands of an uncertain future.”*

*William S. Cohen  
Secretary of Defense  
15 December 1997*

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, the challenges highlighted by Secretary Cohen are today's reality for the United States European Command (USEUCOM). It is my privilege to appear before you to discuss our vast theater, encompassing 83 countries in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa: an area covering over 13 million square miles and serving as home to over 1 billion people; a theater where conflict continues, but the transition to free and democratic governments is making remarkable progress. Since the collapse of communism, Europe has undergone dramatic positive change; Africa is beginning to make real progress; and the Middle East peace process continues, albeit tenuously.

The enormous efforts and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform, combined with the crucial support and resources you provide, are helping shape the post-Cold War security environment in a positive way. By providing training and logistical support, while demonstrating a commitment to democracy, civilian leadership of the military, and human rights, our servicemen and women are setting an example to emulate for the militaries of newly emerging democracies.

### **Strategic Landscape**

In Europe, we are wrestling with the establishment of self-sustaining peace in Bosnia and the establishment of stability in the face of new sources of instability in the Balkans. The former satellite countries of the Warsaw Pact continue to blossom as Western-oriented democracies, three of which have already been accepted into NATO pending parliamentary ratification, and others are clamoring to enter. The new democratic nations of Central and Eastern Europe recognize the critical value of security in the pursuit of their continued development, and seek this security through membership in NATO.

The Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union are also in the throes of reform, with defense, economic, and political efforts to confront the challenges of ridding themselves of the Soviet-style system that generated excessive military resources. Concurrently, they are trying to convert to market economies, compete for international funds and technology, and avoid or deal with instability. They are developing democratic and pluralist forums based on freedom of expression to enhance their recently received independence.

In Western Europe, our NATO allies are similarly in the midst of profound changes associated with the development of a more closely knit European Union working to form a common currency and striving for common foreign and security policies.

Turkey and Greece continue their decades-long dispute in the Aegean with newly emerging problems associated with European Union accession talks on Cyprus. These problems are exacerbated by the planned Greek Cypriot military hardware acquisition, and the hardening of military installations on both sides of that disputed territory. To the east, the lure of untold wealth from undeveloped oil sources in the Transcaucasus and Caspian Basin is drawing attention and providing new incentives for geostrategic rivalry at the crossroads of Eurasia.

To the south, old tensions persist in the Middle East in the Arab-Israeli dispute, punctuated by sharp military exchanges on the northern border of Israel and a continuing debate on the nature and future of security relationships and coexistence with the Palestinian entity. We remain concerned about the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles in this region as well as parts of Northern Africa, fed by continual leakage of high technology from other parts of the world.

In Africa, we see a Mediterranean littoral seething with civil unrest and other internal problems. Deeper in Africa, the independent countries remain hotbeds of political turmoil, driven by competing ambitions, tribal animosities, ethnic insecurities, and hegemonic aspirations.

From a security standpoint, the threat of a Major Theater War with Warsaw Pact forces has been replaced by a plethora of other problems: the proliferation of WMD, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, refugee migration, and instability fueled by ethnic and regional conflict. Many of these challenges do not lend themselves to classic bilateral diplomacy and must be dealt with on a regional basis. Our strategy is designed to deal with these security concerns early, before they become serious problems in the future.

## **STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND READINESS**

***A community of free, stable, and prosperous nations acting together while respecting the dignity and rights of the individual and adhering to the principles of national sovereignty and international law.***

### ***CINCEUR Vision Statement***

To help make this vision a reality, USEUCOM is executing a strategy of regional engagement focused on shaping the international security environment and preventing conflict. However, if we are unable to prevent conflict, we must be ready to respond quickly, preferably in conjunction with allies, with appropriate force to deal with any crisis or defeat any aggressor. While much progress toward democratic reforms has been made throughout the Area of Responsibility (AOR), focused engagement by the U.S. is the surest way to protect our national interests, enhance our long-term security, and create the conditions for promoting democracy and human rights. By engaging when and where we can make a positive difference, with an eye to

maximizing our effort when choices of priority must be made, we are focusing our strategy to ensure we get the maximum impact out of every dollar spent in the USEUCOM theater.

USEUCOM's theater strategy mirrors and supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's *National Military Strategy*, which is derived from the President's *National Security Strategy for a New Century* and the *Quadrennial Defense Review*. The 1997 *National Military Strategy* is based on the concepts of Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now for an Uncertain Future. From this framework and using *Joint Vision 2010* as a conceptual template for our warfighting capabilities, we developed our mission statement and eleven theater objectives designed to make direct and significant contributions to our national security. Our mission statement defines our responsibility:

*USEUCOM is a unified combatant command whose mission is to maintain ready forces to conduct the full spectrum of military operations unilaterally or in concert with coalition partners; to enhance transatlantic security through support of NATO; to promote regional stability; and to advance U.S. interests in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.*

*USEUCOM Mission Statement*

USEUCOM's Theater Objectives:

- Protect and take care of the force.
- Maintain, support, and contribute to the integrity and adaptation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
- Help prepare the militaries of the invited nations to integrate into NATO.
- Promote stability, democratization, military professionalism, and closer relationships with NATO in the nations of Central Europe and the New Independent States.
- Support U.S. efforts to ensure self-sustaining progress from the Dayton Process; develop military institutions in former Yugoslavia adapted to democratic civilian control.
- Support peace initiatives in the Middle East and maintain the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship.
- Ensure freedom of maritime and aeronautic lines of communication (LOCs).
- Promote stability, democratization, and military professionalism in Africa.
- Provide prompt response to humanitarian crises.
- Maintain a high state of readiness in USEUCOM forces.
- Implement *Joint Vision 2010*.

By successfully achieving these objectives, we increase stability and keep the threat of conflict at the lowest level possible. By engaging in peacetime, we shape the security environment, develop coalition partners, and help prevent crises from occurring. Responding to crises before hostilities break out may deter violence or prevent war. Maintaining readiness ensures we can respond with sufficient, trained, and ready forces for any future operation. During the past year, we have demonstrated our readiness in operations from the Balkans, to the Middle East, to central Africa.

## **Bosnia-Herzegovina**

Our success during Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) is the result of superb training and teamwork with our NATO allies, engagement with many of our coalition partners through the PfP, and most importantly, the performance of our superb soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines.

From the outset we knew the mission in BH would not be easy. Despite the difficulties, we have made a great deal of progress. The armies of the former warring factions have been separated, nearly 400,000 troops demobilized, 1,100 prisoners-of-war released, and over 6,600 heavy weapons destroyed. Police reform and public security are improving, and a program to restructure police forces to Western standards is underway. Freedom of movement—without fear of intimidation—is improving throughout the country. Refugee returns will be a true test of progress this year. State-controlled media are being restructured, and independent media are establishing a foothold. Successful municipal elections in BH are resulting in a degree of pluralism and giving the people of BH their first taste of true democracy. Even some indicted war criminals have begun to turn themselves in because the International Criminal Tribunal has proven to be fair and impartial.

The secure environment the Stabilization Force (SFOR) helped create is also allowing the economy to grow. Economic production has doubled, unemployment has dropped from 90 to 50 percent, 200 miles of roads are back in service, electricity has been largely restored, water and sewage systems have been rebuilt, 400 schools have been repaired, and 32,000 additional households had heat this winter. Progress with restructuring the railroad system will also prove crucial to economic recovery.


The past two years of peace have made a major difference, but there is still concern that progress has not been as rapid as originally expected. The U.S. provides a unique catalyst—there is no substitute for American leadership in keeping this process moving forward. In April 1997, the U.S. helped re-energize what was quickly becoming a stalled process, and during recent months we have seen significant progress. In addition to diplomatic efforts, prudent military support for the complex civil implementation process is also essential. SFOR officers acting as advisors to civil implementation organizations are providing an important sense of clarity and focus to the process, and the presence of SFOR lends potent weight to the efforts of the High Representative and other international representatives and organizations. This active SFOR support has been recognized as a crucial factor in initiating and sustaining the progress to date.

With continued progress, I can begin to see a point where civil implementation can sustain itself without military presence. Before that happens, the three instruments of totalitarian control—the army, the police, and the media—must be placed into the hands of legitimate democratic leadership, removed from partisan political control, and sustained—free from the receipt of illegal funds. While there has been some progress in these areas, continued military presence by the NATO-led coalition remains a necessity. The Republica Srpska has until now lagged behind the Federation both in terms of cooperation and economic growth, though the new

Prime Minister, Milorad Dodic, has reversed the anti-Dayton stance of the previous hard line government in Pale. However, President Plavsic will still be hampered by obstructionists in Pale who are attempting to block her efforts both economically and through manipulation of police and security forces. Joint national institutions will function, but they will continue to require pressure from the international community on all parties. Implementation of a final decision on the status of Brcko will likely require international supervision. Finally, because of fresh memories of bloodshed and brutality from the war, reconciliation between ethnic groups will be a slow process.

Because SFOR is a robust force with robust rules of engagement, clarity of mission and unity of command, it has been very successful. To ensure peace and stability in this historically volatile region of the world, continued U.S. leadership and Congressional support remains essential. Continued military presence in Bosnia will be necessary to implement the Dayton Accords sufficiently to achieve self-sustaining processes. It appears from NATO discussions that the follow-on force in Bosnia will be given an attainable mission, U.S. forces will be able to protect themselves, the U.S. will retain overall command, and the European share of the mission will be maximized. Today, SFOR includes approximately 8,500 Americans—about 25% of the total—and troops from other NATO nations and non-NATO contributors including Russia (Figure 1). As we move toward committing NATO and U.S. forces to a Follow-on Force after June 1998, I ask your support for continuation of this vital mission.

#### INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR IFOR/SFOR



**FIGURE 1**

#### **TASK FORCE ABLE SENTRY**

In support of operations in the Balkans, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) continues to provide a Task Force to the United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) to monitor

and report developments along the border of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. During 1997, Task Force ABLE SENTRY incorporated sixty-six National Guardsmen from three states to fill military police, engineer, and aviation positions. Stability in this region will become an increasing concern in 1998, as we do not expect the United Nations to extend UNPREDEP's mandate beyond 31 August 1998. We are examining successor security mechanisms to ensure gains achieved by UNPREDEP are not jeopardized once the mandate expires.

### **Operation NORTHERN WATCH**

For over six years, Operation NORTHERN WATCH (ONW) and its predecessor Operation PROVIDE COMFORT have been enforcing the no-fly zone over Northern Iraq and monitoring Iraqi compliance with applicable United Nations Security Council Resolutions. ONW operates from Turkey with the support and concurrence of the Turkish Parliament.

In September 1997, Iraq responded to an Iranian incursion into Iraq with a series of violations of both the Northern and Southern no-fly zones. These violations were a precursor to the Iraqi confrontation with the international community over weapons inspections. Our response to Iraqi violations of the no-fly zone was to increase coverage time. This increased coverage required an increase in force structure, and our Turkish hosts responded by granting a temporary increase in the maximum number of aircraft and crews.

Our continued close relationship with Turkey is vital to NATO's southern flank and provides an important gateway to the Middle East, the Transcaucasus, and the Caspian Basin in forging future security agreements. Moreover, the multi-national experience gained during Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and NORTHERN WATCH has contributed to successful combined operations in Bosnia.

### **Beirut Air Bridge**

Instability in Lebanon, although improving, has resulted in the continuation of the Beirut Air Bridge—the aerial resupply of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut.

## **ENGAGEMENT**

*American leadership and engagement in the world are vital to our security, and the world is a safer place as a result.*

*President Clinton  
National Security Strategy  
May 1997*

### **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

NATO has been the foundation of U.S. engagement in Europe and the key to relative peace in Europe for nearly 50 years. The Alliance combines the resources of 16 member nations

and leverages military capabilities as well as other forms of international power. Through NATO, the U.S. is able to secure its place as a European power and protect our vital national security interests in the AOR. While U.S. military power in the theater is significant, NATO increases the effectiveness of our forward-stationed forces by providing the basing rights and access we need to project military power from the U.S., enabling us to execute our national and theater strategies. Across the spectrum of military activities, from peacetime engagement to fighting and winning Major Theater Wars, our NATO Alliance remains essential.

Last July, the Alliance extended membership invitations to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. These invitations have been formally accepted by all three countries. In preparation for this enlargement, I have two sets of responsibilities. As NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, I must address the military requirements of enlargement. As Commander in Chief Europe (CINCEUR), I must ensure USEUCOM does its part in providing U.S. military support and assistance to the three prospective new members.

Cost has been a major concern of enlargement. It is best to think of enlargement costs in three categories. First is the cost borne by the new members for their own national security and contributions to the Alliance. Each new invitee has professed a willingness to commit the resources necessary to live up to its obligations under Article 5 of the NATO Charter. As a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, Poland is spending 2.2 percent on defense, the Czech Republic is increasing to 2 percent, and Hungary is increasing to 1.8 percent. This compares favorably with European members of NATO which average 2.2 percent. Moreover, the projected growth rate of their economies is higher than the average for current NATO members, so defense spending should become larger in absolute terms.

The second category includes expenses borne by the 16 current members to enhance their own contributions to the Alliance in support of accession. As NATO adapts from a static defense to emphasize more mobile operational concepts in support of out-of-area contingencies, the operational and strategic deployability of forces has to be strengthened. Fulfilling existing force goals will fully prepare all current members for the strategic requirements of NATO enlargement.

The third category of costs consists of NATO common-funded accounts. These include headquarters operating costs, common operations and maintenance, and the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP). This is the one area that could require additional U.S. funding to support enlargement. Considering the military capabilities of the prospective new members, we estimate the total cost to NATO members in this area will be around \$1.5B, divided among the current 16 members and spread over 10 years. This investment is primarily for communications and air defense link-ups. In addition, we were pleasantly surprised to find the infrastructure of the prospective new members in much better shape than we anticipated.

In a moment, I will enumerate the additional military capabilities Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic bring to the Alliance; however, the foremost factor about all three nations is that they have transitioned to civilian control of their militaries under democratic political leadership. All three have contributed units to the Implementation Forces (IFOR) and Stabilization Forces (SFOR) in Bosnia. Poland and the Czech Republic also contributed forces to the Gulf War Coalition, and Hungary has served as a vital staging area for NATO forces in Bosnia.



While all three prospective members need to modernize their predominately Soviet equipment, they bring significant numbers of troops, tanks, and aircraft to the Alliance. For example, Poland is downsizing to 180,000 troops, and now has 1,700 tanks, 1,400 Armored Combat Vehicles (ACVs), 340 fighter aircraft, and a modest navy. Hungary has 49,000 troops, 800 tanks, 1,300 ACVs, and 80 fighter aircraft. The Czech Republic has 62,000 troops, 950 tanks, 1,360 ACVs, and 115 fighter aircraft. Modernization will take time, but all have committed to the challenge of meeting NATO standards.

### **Partnership for Peace**

An important first step toward NATO membership for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic was their active participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. In the past four years, PfP has become an integral component of the European security architecture. The Program's political vision is to deepen interaction with PfP partners regardless of their intentions toward NATO membership; extend stability toward the east; provide a consultation mechanism for partners who feel threatened; assist partners' pursuit of democratic reforms; and prepare partners for possible NATO membership. The military vision is to deepen military relations; develop interoperable forces and command and control structures; and prepare partners for peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and peace support operations. PfP, in a word, formalizes the relationship between NATO and nearly all the other nations of Europe (Figure 2).

USEUCOM's multifaceted engagement strategy includes NATO PfP and "In the Spirit of" PfP exercises, senior military leadership visits, the bilateral Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), Marshall Center courses, workshops, conferences, and Security Assistance programs. I will explain the rest of these engagement programs in more detail later, but the key point is there have been significant benefits not only to those nations seeking NATO membership, but also for those seeking to improve cooperation with NATO.

## PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE COUNTRIES



**FIGURE 2**

During 1997, the U.S. Army in Europe (USAREUR) participated in 15 PfP exercises in 11 countries including brigade-level command post exercises focusing on peace support operations in Bulgaria (PEACEFUL EAGLE 97) and Poland (BRAVE EAGLE 97). In 1998, USAREUR will participate in 10 PfP exercises in 10 countries. During 1997, United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE), participated in 9 PfP exercises and sponsored 175 Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) events. USAFE conducted several key exercise planning events through the JCTP in the months prior to the “In The Spirit of” PfP Exercise EAGLE’S TALON with Poland that directly contributed to the success of the largest and most complex air exercise the U.S. has ever conducted in a former Warsaw Pact nation. In 1998, in line with USAFE’s Focused Engagement Strategy, our air component will participate in 7 PfP exercises and coordinate over 150 JCTP events focusing on increased interoperability. U.S. Navy Forces in Europe (USNAVEUR) participated in 16 PfP exercises in 10 nations during FY97. USNAVEUR led BALTOPS 97 and BALTIC CHALLENGE, exercising up to 10 regional Baltic nations. In the Black Sea region, USNAVEUR led COOPERATIVE PARTNER and SEA BREEZE 97, multinational southern regional exercises enhancing training with Black Sea and NATO partners and improving interoperability with Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria.

COMBINED ENDEAVOR, a Headquarters USEUCOM sponsored “In The Spirit Of” Partnership for Peace exercise, is a one-of-a-kind communications and information systems interoperability exercise. It has become the testbed for defining Command, Control, Communication, and Computer (C4) requirements as it charts the course toward an interoperable future with coalition partners. Embraced by both NATO and PfP nations, it has seen astounding growth since its inception in 1995. Twenty-nine nations will participate in COMBINED ENDEAVOR 98, including PfP nations from the Newly Independent States such as Russia and Ukraine. The USEUCOM PfP Environmental Conference will host representatives from 16

Central and Eastern European countries and will be held in Hungary. This is the first such conference to be held outside Germany and will focus on the environmental aspects of military operations and exercises. The PfP program is already paying big dividends for operations in Bosnia with over 30 nations providing support, and nearly one-third of the forces coming from non-NATO nations.

USEUCOM's forward-stationed and rotationally deployed forces promote trust, cooperation, peace, and stability through a number of engagement programs. Our European allies are unwavering in their belief that U.S. leadership is the bond holding together an alliance that has achieved nearly 50 years of relative peace in Europe. In addition, the U.S. has no historic baggage or territorial ambitions, and for these reasons is particularly trusted and welcome in the nations of Central Europe.

Peacetime engagement uses military resources to shape the future security environment. We have demonstrated over the years we can respond to crisis situations, and we maintain our readiness to do so. A larger challenge, and potentially of more benefit, is to develop and execute a strategy that prevents conflict. USEUCOM's engagement programs are effective, wide-ranging, and cost-effective elements of our theater strategy. Five highly successful USEUCOM engagement programs in the AOR are the JCTP, the State Partnership Program, the George C. Marshall European Center for Strategic Studies, the Security Assistance program, and Arms Control initiatives.

### **Joint Contact Team Program**

The JCTP is one of the key elements of USEUCOM's peacetime engagement program. This program brings American ideals and democratic values to 14 countries in Central Europe and the New Independent States (Figure 3). Joint Military Liaison Teams of three to five members help host nations see how our military functions under civilian control in a democracy. Over 4,800 bilateral military-to-military exchange events arranged by these teams have helped host nations implement human rights guarantees for soldiers, facilitate progress toward civilian control of the military, establish military legal codes, build programs to develop professional noncommissioned officer corps and a more professional officer corps, a chaplaincy corps to lay the foundation for religious freedom and to promote human dignity, and a military more interoperable with NATO.

All branches of the U.S. military, including both Active and Reserve Components, contribute to provide a clear example of the benefits of a U.S.-style military, as well as offer American solutions to myriad challenges faced by these developing militaries. An important part of our bilateral peacetime engagement, JCTP events pave the way for countries to participate in Security Assistance and PfP activities. This highly successful program leverages limited manpower and fiscal resources and can only be accomplished with the continued support of the Reserve Components, who conduct nearly a quarter of all JCTP events.

## JOINT CONTACT TEAM PROGRAM COUNTRIES



FIGURE 3

### State Partnership Program

American service members serving in the Guard and Reserves are particularly effective advocates for democratic ideals and civilian control of the military. They provide a tangible example of the American concept of the citizen-soldier as we guide these countries toward transparent, defensive-oriented militaries. Beside the 14 JCTP countries, State National Guard units have established “Partnerships” with seven other nations, bringing the total number of countries participating in the State Partnership Program to 21 (Figure 4).

#### STATE PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES




FIGURE 4

USEUCOM leverages these State Partner relationships to support engagement activities in the theater. These relationships have been highly successful in gaining the trust of people who were on the other side of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War. In addition, State Partnership exercises and projects provide vital, practical services, such as hospital upgrades and water purification systems to countries struggling to implement democratic reforms and market economies. The support of our Reserve Components in executing these activities is not only appreciated, it is essential.

### Marshall Center

The George C. Marshall European Center for Strategic Studies supports our engagement in many ways. The Defense and Security Studies Program offers post graduate-level studies focused on the formulation and conduct of national security in democratic societies. All courses

are taught in English, German, and Russian, and may include participants from up to 34 countries. With the completion of its seventh class in December 1997, the Marshall Center's total number of graduates is 562. The new curriculum—redesigned for 1998—will double the annual number of participants.

The 18-month Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program has educated 1,084 U.S. military officers and Defense Department civilians since its inception in 1947. We currently have 63 FAOs training for key assignments involving the New Independent States. The Foreign Language Training Center Europe (FLTCE) offers classroom and in-country instruction in nine languages for military and civilian linguists. The Marshall Center Conference Center organized 14 conferences for fiscal year 1997 on a variety of security-related topics designed to engage participants in constructive discussion. The Conference Center works closely with the Marshall Center faculty and requesting countries to ensure conference purpose, objectives, and scope fulfill the needs of the participants. The final Marshall Center program is the Research Program, which includes research workshops involving renowned scholars from throughout Europe and Eurasia.

### **African Crisis Response Initiative**

The ACRI is a multi-lateral training initiative intended to work cooperatively with both African and non-African countries. The goal is to increase interoperability among African militaries in their support of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. The initiative calls for the limited delivery of non-lethal equipment such as radios, generators, and individual soldier equipment. Once equipment is available, U.S. trainers deploy and conduct a training program tailored to each country's needs. There is no intention of creating a standing African force.

Last July, members of the 3rd Special Forces Group conducted Phase I training in Uganda and Senegal, in September they conducted training in Malawi, and in January they trained soldiers in Mali. Additionally, ACRI training for Ethiopia and Ghana will be conducted in 1998. The initial training program is focused on peacekeeping skills. The training is designed to enhance basic soldier and junior leader skills, improve combat support and combat service support capabilities, develop battalion staffs capable of conducting multi-echelon operations, and eventually, develop a brigade or joint task force headquarters capable of conducting multi-national operations. Follow-on sustainment training focused on staff development and logistics training, and regional exercises will be conducted to ensure ACRI trained units maintain proficiency.

An additional benefit of exposure to the U.S. military through the ACRI program is the potential for shaping the African environment by promoting professional apolitical militaries, creating respect for human rights, and providing a strong example of the role of the military in a democracy. The ACRI will prepare both African and U.S. militaries for future operations in Africa by providing the knowledge and relationships necessary to respond to crises and humanitarian situations in Africa. To date, six African nations have committed to raise seven battalions for use by the ACRI.

The number of operations we conduct each year in Africa makes success of the ACRI particularly important. For example, during the past year we deployed and were prepared to

conduct Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) from Zaire and Congo-Brazzaville, and successfully conducted a NEO in Sierra Leone. In these NEOs, thousands of Americans and third-country nationals were moved to safety during crisis periods. Seventy-five percent of our operations requiring standup of a joint task force occurred in Africa.

### **Security Assistance**

One of our primary methods of carrying out our foreign and national security policy remains Security Assistance, a wide-ranging program that includes the transfer of defense articles, defense services, military training, and financial assistance. The program is made up of several components including Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and International Military Education and Training (IMET).

FMF enables nations to improve their defensive capabilities by assisting in the acquisition of U.S. military goods, services, and training. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia provides an example of how FMF is being utilized to meet this objective. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was allocated \$7.9M in FMF for FY98. A portion of this amount will be used to assist the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in developing an adequate defense capability in the face of UNPREDEP's withdrawal, while the remainder will facilitate the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's participation in PFP and improve its interoperability with NATO forces. The FY99 FMF request for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is \$6M. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is committed to the Regional Airspace Initiative, and approximately \$5 million of FY 99 FMF is earmarked for purchasing an Air Sovereignty Operation Center. These enhancements allow the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to become more self-sufficient in their security needs at a time when UN forces are withdrawing. A similar example is found with the African Crisis Response Initiative where FMF is used to offset costs of training and equipping personnel from African nations who then assume humanitarian and peacekeeping responsibilities in the region.

IMET is a cornerstone of our military relations programs throughout the USEUCOM AOR. Almost 1,200 international students were trained in U.S. military schools in the FY97 IMET program, and we are expecting to train over 1,600 students in FY98 (Figure 5). Our efforts are focused primarily in three areas: professional development, the role of the military in a democracy (under the Expanded IMET initiative), and English language development. In FY97, 555 international officers attended professional development schools, and 134 English instructors from 32 countries were trained. Additionally, 308 military and civilian personnel from 53 countries attended training in the U.S. on the role of the military in a democracy, concentrating in such areas as military justice, defense resources planning, and civil-military relations.

In FY98, we plan to send IMET-sponsored mobile education teams to 41 countries to provide training in military justice, resources management, budget planning, civil-military relations, and maritime law enforcement. This will allow senior international leaders, who cannot afford the time to attend courses in the U.S., to receive training. In addition, we are including a new program in International Health Resources Management to help countries better integrate their military health programs with other national-level health program efforts.

IMET dividends continue to outweigh the small U.S. investment when we consider the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff is IMET-trained, and the Chiefs of Czech Republic's ground and air forces are both IMET graduates. These are just three of the numerous IMET success stories throughout USEUCOM's AOR.

#### IMET COUNTRIES FOR 1998




FIGURE 5

#### Arms Control

Arms Control illustrates success in another important area of engagement. Significant reductions in weapons and increases in transparency have yielded corresponding reductions in tensions and the potential for future conflict. For the past decade, USEUCOM has been actively involved in arms control efforts. Nowhere in the world does the level or spectrum of activity in arms control match what is taking place in the USEUCOM AOR. The USEUCOM staff and components have developed a multi-service, integrated network of experts to ensure complete U.S. compliance with the protocol and confidence-building measures of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Vienna Document 1994, and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. With the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), USAREUR conducted the only overseas CWC training inspection for 1997. USNAVEUR conducted a mock Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces compliance inspection at Comiso, Italy. Within the scope of the Vienna Document 1994, USAFE is preparing to host a Conventional Air Base visit with senior officers from 53 countries invited to a USAFE facility to tour and observe operations. Our daily demonstration of responsible participation in the international security process has implications far beyond the boundaries of USEUCOM's AOR. Nations of the Middle East, Asia, and South



America look to the U.S., and hence to USEUCOM, as a role model for how to responsibly implement arms control regimes.

USEUCOM will remain fully engaged and supportive of arms control initiatives. We seek to shape the evolution of existing agreements: adaptation of the CFE Treaty and enhancement of the Vienna Document 1994. The impact of the Ottawa Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention on NATO interoperability is being assessed and USEUCOM's implementation of U.S. anti-personnel landmine policy is being developed as we work toward enhanced European security while retaining NATO operational flexibility. Close consultations with present and future allies, both bilateral and within the overall NATO context, will remain the key to ensuring USEUCOM remains positioned to serve U.S. security interests as the European arms control environment continues to evolve.

### **Anti-personnel Landmines**

I am concerned about the potential military consequences of the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines (APLs). Self-destructing and self-deactivating APLs, and Anti-Tank (AT)/APL mixed systems constitute a critical force protection and counter-mobility asset. Our field commanders count on these systems to protect the force, influence maneuver, shape the battlespace, and mass combat power for decisive engagement. The requirement for such a capability is increasing in light of evolving and future operational concepts that envision our forces conducting dispersed operations over expanded battlespace. We must work deliberately and discreetly with our Allies to ensure we can execute our NATO warfighting plans, as well as our unilateral missions, once the Ottawa APL agreement comes into force.

### **Convention on the Law of the Sea**

The legal regime established under the Convention on the Law of the Sea will protect our naval and air forces in all aspects of their operations on, under, and over the high seas, littorals, and maritime choke-points. United States forces will be able to rely on predictable and accepted rule of law rather than the whims of coastal states. Ratification of the Convention is important to United States national security interests.

In summary, engagement programs are making a tremendous contribution to the trust and stability among the countries of the USEUCOM AOR. By engaging countries in peacetime, we are providing the opportunity for internal growth and stability before crises occur. Engagement programs are an investment designed to shape the future security environment in a positive way, and immediate results are often difficult to quantify. However, these programs are a real bargain compared with the billions of dollars it costs to respond to a single crisis or major operation. Combined funding for the JCTP, the State Partnership Program, the Marshall Center, and IMET in the USEUCOM AOR comes to approximately \$60M per year.

Beyond this, exercises also serve as vital engagement opportunities with our allies and other countries in the theater and include a wide range of conventional, medical, and Special Operations activities. In the case of African exercises, these small engagement events are often the only mil-to-mil contact the U.S. and these countries have throughout the year and remain vital

to maintaining effective engagement on the African Continent. Last spring, the U.S. Navy conducted a maritime exercise off the coast of South Africa. We have also conducted medical humanitarian exercises and PfP exercises with countries beyond the boundaries of the USEUCOM AOR in the New Independent States, most recently in Armenia last October. We are also developing a first-ever Organization for African Unity (OAU) crisis management exercise in Ethiopia that will have a future impact on almost every country in Africa. The enhanced trust, understanding, and interoperability gained through exercises with other nations make every aspect of our strategy more effective.

## **USEUCOM: A TAILORED, FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCE**

*“We have to be forward deployed, and we have to be diplomatically engaged...helping shape and influence events so that they really work to our benefit.”*

*William S. Cohen  
Secretary of Defense*

Forward presence, vital to implementing our strategy, is achieved through a combination of deployments, rotational forces, and forward-stationed forces. Deployments are vital not only to support ongoing operations and exercises within the command, but also give stateside forces an opportunity to exercise their skills in a realistic environment. However, deployments are expensive, temporary, and incapable of maintaining sufficient presence in the theater.

Rotational forces also serve a vital component of our forward-deployed force. Naval assets make up the majority of USEUCOM's rotational forces and spread U.S. presence throughout the AOR where there are no permanently-stationed forces, pushing east into the Black Sea and south into the waters off Sub-Saharan Africa. These rotational, strategically mobile forces can be tailored with engagement forces, such as Special Operations teams aboard Patrol Craft, or U.S. Coast Guard training teams embarked on Navy or Coast Guard ships. Forward-deployed naval forces conducting engagement activities can easily transition to crisis response in theater or beyond. This was demonstrated last year with the movement of USS GEORGE WASHINGTON and escorts into the Persian Gulf during the international community's confrontation with Iraq over access to potential weapons sites. Naval assets deployed from USEUCOM can be on-station two weeks faster than ships deployed from the East Coast of the U.S. Other Services and the Special Operations Command also deploy rotational forces from both the Active and Reserve Components, supporting engagement programs, numerous exercises, and Operations JOINT GUARD and NORTHERN WATCH. These rotational forces are a vital complement to U.S. presence in theater.

Forward-deployed forces are able to respond more quickly to crises. USEUCOM teams have repeatedly engaged in areas throughout the region where evolving crises could potentially erupt into serious conflict. The average response time for USEUCOM forces executing five Non-Combatant Evacuations during 1997 was only four days, and four of these operations were conducted in Africa, over 3,000 miles from their home station or normal area of operations. Additionally, USAFE recently deployed an Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) to support Operation

JOINT GUARD. The AEF was in place and ready to respond within 48 hours. These forward-deployed service members are vital to preventing conflict and keeping potential crises under control.

Forward-stationed forces are fundamental to executing our theater strategy across the spectrum of operations. Many aspects of our theater strategy simply cannot be achieved without forces permanently stationed in our theater. For example, our daily military-to-military contacts with NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries, our robust exercise program, and our demonstration of commitment and leadership in Europe cannot be replaced by temporary forces. In addition, the Joint Analysis Center (JAC) at Molesworth, U.K. provides regional focus and responsiveness to theater intelligence taskings critical to our force protection efforts.

In those cases when conflict cannot be avoided, forward-stationed forces and infrastructure are key to rapid response and enable Continental United States (CONUS)-based forces to deploy when needed. A prime example is Southwest Asia, an area all agree is vital to our national security interests and susceptible to continued problems. USEUCOM forward-stationed forces give us access to basing and infrastructure necessary to project CONUS-based military power into the Middle East. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, 95 percent of our strategic airlift, 90 percent of our combat aircraft, and 85 percent of our naval vessels were staged through USEUCOM's AOR. Forward-stationed forces allow CONUS-based forces to get to a crisis area in time to make a difference.

USEUCOM's permanently stationed forces today number around 100,000 troops, down from over 300,000 during the Cold War. The current force level represents a 65 percent reduction from 1990 and is the minimum level needed to execute our *National Security Strategy*, meet NATO requirements, conduct engagement programs, and provide a foundation for CONUS reinforcements.

***“We will maintain approximately 100,000 military personnel in Europe to preserve U.S. influence and leadership in NATO, sustain our vital transatlantic ties, provide a visible deterrent, respond to crises and contribute to regional stability”.***

***President Clinton  
National Security Strategy  
May 1997***

### **Reserve Components**

The Reserve Components' contribution to the wide spectrum of operations in the USEUCOM AOR deserves special mention. We could not sustain our current level of operations, primarily in the mission support area, without access to the units, personnel, and resources in the Reserve Components. Many operations we execute today require special skills available only in the Reserve Components. Virtually all the Army's water purification specialists, helicopter heavy lift units, chemical brigades, enemy prisoner of war units, and civil affairs units are in the Army

Reserve and National Guard. The Naval Reserve provides nearly 100 percent of Navy air logistics support, combat air search and rescue, and naval coastal warfare. The Marine Corps Reserve, and the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard maintain unique skills and units that provide critical support to the total force. In Bosnia, we relied on Reserve Component COMMANDO SOLO C-130 aircraft to fairly influence media transmissions prior to and during key elections. In places like central Africa and Bosnia, these are indispensable skills and make augmenting our active forces a prerequisite.

Although the Reserve Components are resourced for readiness, many of our engagement programs such as the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) and PfP exercises receive crucial support from the Reserve Components. In FY97, reserve forces conducted nearly 25 percent of our JCTP events and provided forces for 10 of the 15 PfP exercises conducted by U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). State National Guard units from Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Michigan will participate in the U.S. Naval Forces Europe (USNAVEUR)-led BALTIC CHALLENGE 98. This maritime, land, and air exercise will include over 3,100 soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen from 14 Baltic regional nations. The establishment of the Joint European Reserve Unit at Headquarters USEUCOM this fiscal year will ensure full Active and Reserve Component integration in the future. This integration into all aspects of our operations provides an essential complement to our forward-stationed forces.

## **READINESS**

USEUCOM's operational tempo continues at a record pace and it presents many challenges to maintaining individual, unit, and joint readiness in support of national security interests. Long duration and back-to-back peacekeeping or humanitarian operations of the kind we have experienced since 1994 hinder the ability of combat units to maintain their readiness for high-intensity operations. Combat units experience the most degradation since peacekeeping and humanitarian missions are radically different from conventional warfighting missions. Individual units also experience readiness degradation when some of their personnel are forward-deployed to back-fill other units supporting contingency operations. Additionally, our ability to provide forces to support a Major Theater War (MTW) scenario depends on our ability to rapidly withdraw from contingency operations, reconstitute and retrain our forces, and redeploy to the affected theater(s). USEUCOM's participation in the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) process allows the USEUCOM staff and components to assess their readiness and capability to execute operations for various scenarios. The JMRR assesses readiness in the context of one or two MTWs. More applicable from a theater perspective, however, is our readiness to respond to the next regional contingency such as a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO). There is no empirical way of measuring readiness against all possible mission taskings, and commanders rely on the Status of Readiness and Training System (SORTS) to monitor their individual unit readiness. SORTS helps commanders focus resources and training in areas that need attention.

Using SORTS, readiness issues impacting this theater can be identified. U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) has F-15E squadrons that have significant problems with spare parts for the 229 Engine. Corrective actions have been initiated, but the get well date is not until May of 1999. Until then, we will experience aircraft that do not have serviceable engines. Similar but not as

extreme are spare parts problems with the F-16 and F-15C. U.S. Army in Europe (USAREUR) has several units that are undergoing post-deployment training cycles to achieve full readiness status. Some contingency missions present opportunities to maintain training requirements while deployed, especially for combat support and combat service support units such as military police, logistics, maintenance, communications, space operations, and medical units. These units are able to hone their primary operational skills while deployed and therefore have less of a challenge in achieving the required training proficiency upon re-deployment.

The ability to deploy troops quickly and set up forward units has improved through the experience gained while supporting contingency operations. In addition, forward-deployed units, operating together for extended periods, build a level of teamwork and camaraderie impossible to develop during normal garrison activities. The discipline and unit cohesion gained during operations in Bosnia, central Africa, and other non-warfighting activities cannot be underestimated.

Another important resource requirement that impacts readiness is infrastructure maintenance. Housing infrastructure is a QOL and retention issue, but base support infrastructure is critical to mission accomplishment and readiness. USAREUR will have a FY 99 shortfall of over \$550 million in infrastructure accounts. USNAVEUR's shortfall is \$34M and USAFE is \$117M short for FY 99. With these shortfalls, local commanders are forced into an "emergency repair only" mode with subsequent impact on mission accomplishment.

### **Training**

Our training programs are specifically designed to ensure our troops are prepared for the full spectrum of military operations. Units routinely train for their roles on the high-intensity battlefields of Major Theater Wars as they have always done. Units tasked for participation in non-conventional operations undergo an intense train-up period for the specific mission they will be assigned prior to deployment. Our experience in Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD taught us that under normal conditions, the time needed to rest, reconstitute, and retrain units to their full level of classical warfighting skills is roughly equal to the time they were deployed for a non-conventional operation. In a crisis, the time required to "get up to speed" could be reduced significantly, though ground combat units would need more time to recover than air and naval units. We constantly seek opportunities to enhance readiness during contingency operations while developing training programs to maintain classical warfighting skills. We did this during Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD by pulling troops out of Bosnia for training at sites in Hungary.

### **Exercises**

Another important element of our readiness plan is a robust exercise program. Joint and combined exercises with our NATO Allies, PfP countries, and several North African nations form the backbone of our exercise program and increase interoperability. The majority of USEUCOM exercises are conducted to promote military readiness in the traditional sense. Of particular importance is our re-engineered Joint Task Force (JTF) Training and Exercise Program that keeps

USEUCOM's seven designated JTF Headquarters trained and ready for theater contingencies across the operational spectrum. In FY 97, this improved program enhanced joint and combined force readiness and continues to leverage the professional expertise of the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC).

## **RESOURCES**

### **Force Protection**

Antiterrorism/force protection is a key element of readiness as well as quality of life. Our people must be able to feel secure about the safety of their families and themselves. We take this business very seriously at USEUCOM.

My highest priority for the USEUCOM theater is force protection. Our business by definition involves risk. While we cannot eliminate risk, we can reduce it to acceptable levels through awareness, intelligence, sound tactical and operational security procedures, training, leadership, command involvement, risk assessments and management, and antiterrorism readiness. To accomplish this goal, USEUCOM has moved forward on a number of antiterrorism/force protection initiatives.

First, we made force protection readiness a keystone of commanders' business. As such, we are working to assist commanders to identify and reduce risk of terrorist attack. Our concern encompasses service members, DoD civilians, and their family members in all DoD activities and organizations in theater. Our assessment program is robust, and we have assessed the force protection readiness of all facilities and installations located in medium, high, and critical threat areas in the USEUCOM AOR. The assessment program not only identifies shortcomings, but also assists commanders in finding the best means to develop adequate counter measures to the threat. We have instituted a program to track the state of readiness as installations and facilities implement recommendations for force protection countermeasures made by assessment teams. We are aggressively seeking funds under the Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund system to implement force protection countermeasures in theater.

We are also working to conclude agreements with Chiefs of Mission in our AOR to ensure all DoD personnel deployed to and working in a particular country receive adequate force protection.

A critical component of antiterrorism readiness is ensuring all of our troops and civilians receive awareness training and understand how to mitigate the danger associated with terrorism. All operations and exercises now involve force protection planning. Units deploying into or within our AOR conduct site surveys, which assess potential risks to terrorist attacks. Our intelligence operations have increased their focus on detecting and assessing potential terrorist activity. We have a robust system to disseminate information regarding specific terrorist threats to units and individuals throughout the AOR.

## Quality of Life

Our most precious resource is the DoD family, made up of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguardsmen, civilian employees and their families. As *Joint Vision 2010* affirms, “The judgment, creativity, and fortitude of our people will remain the key to success in future joint operations.” Accordingly, QOL is one of my highest theater priorities. It directly affects readiness, retention, military values, family life, morale, and mission accomplishment. Our Theater Personnel Readiness Campaign Plan places the highest possible importance on QOL. My goal is to ensure USEUCOM forces enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of the society they are pledged to defend and that of their DoD counterparts stateside. As we train, work, and fight more jointly, we should establish the highest possible joint QOL standards. As we have seen in USEUCOM, joint basing and interaction between troops from all Services illuminate the differences among The Services’ QOL standards, leading to morale problems and creating a potentially negative impact on readiness.

Community and family programs provide vital links to the American way of life and include child care centers, schools, commissaries, exchanges, and physical fitness centers. Support facilities and programs in military communities overseas reinforce our service and civic values and nurture our sense of community. Overseas troops, civilian employees, and families often rely solely on these programs for support because they do not have the same off-base alternatives as do their counterparts in CONUS. We must ensure our deployed troops can stay focused on their demanding and dangerous military tasks, without worrying about the support and care for family members left behind.

Our Personnel Readiness Campaign Plan calls for an active and engaging QOL program in which the dependent school system plays a vitally important role. In USEUCOM our families deploy twice; once as a family unit overseas and then the service member is often called upon to deploy forward. They deserve a world class school system. The Congressional reduction of \$10M in the FY 98 Defense Authorization Act has seriously impacted the quality of our educational system in Europe. The associated reduction had to be balanced between security concerns, base operating support, home partnership, supplies, staff support and other in school initiatives. As a result, curriculum as well as co-curriculum programs that are critical to maintaining the basic standard our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and their families deserve have been put at risk. As an example, the reduction in the Turkey school district alone resulted in reduced opportunities for the students to participate in significant co-curricular activities, which impacts all facets of the education system. The bottom line is that the DoDDs budget must be sacrosanct. We must provide an environment designed to prepare students for success in a dynamic, global environment. Rather than reducing educational budgets, we must look forward to making technology a reality in our schools. Technology and connecting our schools to the Internet will ensure our students, particularly those in remote areas, have the requisite tools to meet the challenges of tomorrow. Although, this may be an expensive short-term proposition, we must recognize its long term value. Our children deserve the best, and we owe our service members an aggressive and vibrant education system that enhances all aspects of QOL programs.

In addition, we must ensure the medical benefits of our overseas personnel and their families are maintained and enhanced wherever possible. The TRICARE Europe Prime program

continues to provide deductible and cost sharing waivers for beneficiaries receiving host nation care. Congressional support for the overseas Family Member Dental Program is an important next step to provide affordable host nation dental care to beneficiaries without access to U.S. military dental services. At locations where we do not use host nation health care services, it is essential our military medical facilities continue to receive appropriate resources and medical construction funds to meet U.S. health care standards.

Finally, we must provide our forces with a way of life that is both safe and secure—a QOL standard I call freedom from fear. To meet this objective, we must ensure full funding is provided for programs dealing not only with force protection, but also crime, drugs, and family violence.

### **Housing**

Last year Congress supported 100% of the FY98 Military Construction and Family Housing projects in the USEUCOM theater. I greatly appreciate your support, and I assure you the troops and their families appreciate it as well. However, as those of you who have visited the theater know, most of our housing falls far below DoD standards. Many of these World War II-era facilities have never been renovated and are in deplorable condition, which is why we are concentrating on a “worst first” strategy. Getting our service members out of common use latrine barracks and dormitories remains our highest priority. The Air Force will buy out the replacement or renovation of all central latrine dormitories in FY99. If current investment levels continue, and critical facilities and housing sustainment is adequately resourced, the Army is on track to meet its goal of rehabilitating all of its barracks by 2010. Unfortunately, we are still far behind in family housing. At current funding levels, the Army will not buy out the 11,000 worst units (those not renovated since they were constructed in the 1950s) until 2018. Renovation of the worst Air Force housing in theater will not be complete until 2010. This is far too long and will still leave many homes that fall far short of DoD standards.

In short, the problems associated with shortages of construction and major repair funds, as well as undersized, temporary, and inefficient facilities, are compounded by an even more critical shortage of RPM funds. A steady commitment to infrastructure funding will be required to provide the quality homes, work places, and support facilities our troops and their families deserve. We are doing everything we can to stretch our infrastructure dollars, but the need is greater than the resources available. We are dedicated to improving the condition of the facilities where our troops and their families live and work—this is my single most important QOL issue.

### **Modernization**

Providing high quality weapons and equipment for our forces is the responsibility of the Services. I make crucial input to the acquisition and requirements process through the Integrated Priority List (IPL); the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS); and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). As a command that integrates the equipment and capabilities of all U.S. military services, as well as the armed forces of other nations, we help ensure the procurement of cost-effective systems providing the greatest balance, capability, and interoperability for joint and combined operations with allies and coalition partners.



### **Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations**

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) provide operationally and fiscally prudent future military systems. We have approval to proceed with five new ACTDs, in addition to two already on-going. All contribute to the implementation of the tenets of *Joint Vision 2010*. I urge you to continue funding these valuable programs.

### **Bridging and Gap Crossing Systems**

As proved in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Operation DESERT STORM, potential enemies can easily create challenges to our forces by employing minefields, removing bridges, or creating other complex obstacles. Our heavy combat forces face a severe deficiency in overcoming these problems due to the lack of mobile and survivable breaching and gap crossing systems. We need systems that can close the operational gap in our current force structure by providing heavily armored mobility assets that can maintain the tempo needed on today's battlefield.

### **Strategic Mobility**

Strategic mobility is crucial across the spectrum of conflict. In terms of airlift and sealift, we are the only nation in the world with the mobility assets to respond where and when needed. In many situations our allies and friends are willing to provide troops, equipment, and supplies but do not possess the lift force structure for movement to the area of operation. Even with our forward-stationed forces, most contingencies will require strategic mobility augmentation from CONUS. Whereas lift improvement in airframes and ship hulls is being addressed, we have not yet done enough to remedy shortfalls in the en route infrastructure nodes within the USEUCOM AOR. Specifically, upgrading the fuel dispensing hydrant system at Moron Air Base and the runway/ramp-space at Rota Naval Station are critical to sustaining U.S. and NATO support to theater and out-of-theater throughput of forces.

### **Theater Missile Defense**

We must also continue to pursue the development of a viable NATO Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system. Part of this involves creating a TMD framework integrating present and future systems supporting the three pillars of TMD (Active Defense, Passive Defense, and Counter Force/Attack Operations) and the associated Battle Management Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence architecture.

In June of 1997, two Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)-equipped U.S. Navy AEGIS cruisers participated in the European air defense exercise CENTRAL ENTERPRISE 97. During the exercise, the Navy ships successfully demonstrated the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) Link 16 combined network with a NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft and Royal Air Force Tornados. In FY 98 the USS JOHN C. STENNIS Carrier Battle Group will deploy with the capability to conduct Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) targeting and surveillance operations in the Mediterranean. We have already achieved progress in passive

defense by attaining Full Operational Capability (FOC) of Shared Early Warning (SEW) with Israel in August 1997 and with NATO in October 1997. These landmark achievements will undoubtedly deter some adversaries from conducting TBM attacks against our forces and our allies.

Despite these accomplishments, our current active defense capabilities are not adequate to meet the future challenges of protecting the NATO's Mediterranean southern region, Israel in the Middle East, or combined forces operating out-of-area. There are several new TMD initiatives in the design and development stage that meet these shortfalls. A cooperative burdensharing approach toward the emerging WMD threat will yield affordable, interoperable systems providing protection against TBM, air breathing airframe, and eventually cruise missile threats to U.S. and allied forces, and to areas of vital/major interests. The Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC III) will respond soonest to meeting the terminal/point TBM shortfall in the development of lower-tier TMD. Navy AREA Ballistic Missile Defense systems will be the first TBM systems to deploy to the Mediterranean with greater than a point defense capability.

The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), a U.S.-German-Italian initiative, will provide a long-term, 360 degree, hit-to-kill, lower-tier capability simultaneously solving the allied interoperability and deployability shortfalls while enhancing force protection for operations conducted out-of-area. We must immediately dedicate funding for this program in the out-years in order to demonstrate commitment to the MEADS initiative in line with our partner allies budget funding approval in 1999.

Additionally, the Arrow Deployability Program, a U.S.-Israel TMD initiative, expands TMD technology in enhancing range, altitude, multi-target tracking, and interception capability for a middle-tier TMD. These FY98 approved TMD initiatives demonstrate the cooperative potential and direction necessary to achieve an effective future TBM/WMD active defense. Until these active defenses become a reality, USEUCOM will continue to emphasize Counter Force/Attack Operations to destroy an adversary's WMD launch and facility capability, as well as a viable nuclear capability in support of NATO efforts to deter WMD.

### **Information Superiority**

*Joint Vision 2010* emphasizes the importance of information superiority throughout the theater through both offensive and defensive Information Warfare (IW). The ability of modern forces to compress operational timelines demands commanders maintain a greater level of battlespace awareness than in the past. As a result of technological advances, theater information systems are under a continuously changing threat and must be protected. We are working with our components to establish focused Information Operations (IO) processes in this regard. USEUCOM is developing a coordinated defensive infrastructure involving our components as well as support agencies such as DISA and NSA to protect our information and information systems. Currently, USEUCOM has the responsibility for maintaining Linked Operations Intelligence Centers Europe (LOCE)—originally designed as a NATO-only information dissemination system has greatly aided the dissemination of U.S. intelligence to coalition partners in the Balkans. The LOCE Correlation Center, located at the Joint Analysis Center, RAF

Molesworth, UK, functions as the U.S. gateway for exchange of operations intelligence with NATO. It also provides the TBM data architecture supporting shared early warning among NATO and theater components and remains a top priority for continued support and funding for needed enhancements as NATO expands and combined operations increase.

The success of both IFOR and SFOR over the previous two years has expanded our understanding of how to disseminate information to the warfighter more efficiently. In particular, the Global Broadcast Service Phase II will exploit high bandwidth broadcast communications, providing timely delivery of bulk information products to forward-deployed elements with emphasis at the tactical level. Global Command and Control System (GCCS) will provide common functionality to all warfighting areas and will be the system of choice to solve the common operational picture shortfall existing today. A robust and technically mature Defense Information Systems Network-Europe capable of being rapidly extended to all corners of our AOR with sufficient bandwidth to meet future requirements is critical to forces deployed within, and from, the USEUCOM AOR. We also need your support for the Digital European Backbone (DEB) which will provide long-haul communications throughout the AOR and meet our requirement to have a U.S. owned and operated Command, Control, and Communications (C3) network in Europe. The current system does not meet current or future communications requirements, while the new system will expand transmission capability six times, with a return on investment of less than four years. Modern communications infrastructure supporting our intelligence, strategic mobility, logistic sustainment, and force protection are critical enablers to meeting the operational shortfalls of our allies and friends in order to ensure success in combined operations.

### **Information Collection Architecture**

As information collection architectures mature, we need to ensure the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) end-to-end process of collection through tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination is synchronized and complete. USEUCOM has a requirement for balance in our ISR architecture—imagery, signals, measurement and sensing, communications, and human intelligence—in order to achieve dominate battlespace awareness throughout our AOR. Too much emphasis on a single component such as Future Imagery Architecture, at the expense of other intelligence programs and systems, may deny USEUCOM and our allies the ability to effectively support the warfighter. It makes little sense to spend a large amount of money to obtain high-quality imagery if those pictures cannot be interpreted and disseminated in time to impact decisions on the battlefield.

### **Airborne Reconnaissance Low**

USEUCOM has a near-term requirement for Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) airframes. This multi-capable imagery and signals intelligence sensor is ideally suited to support information collection throughout our expanding AOR. This platform provides Alliance interoperability and downlink to Combined Joint Task Force operations conducted out-of-area. Although follow-on ISR systems are identified in the out-years, we currently have requirements that can best be filled by ARL.

## **Infrastructure**

While modernization is very important, our failing theater infrastructure is an immediate concern. Our infrastructure is the theater's force projection platform. With the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) complete, we have reached a stable theater troop strength, and we continue adjusting our basing to save money and improve quality and efficiency. As we learned from the drawdown in the U.S., it costs money to close and realign facilities, and USEUCOM has closed more facilities than any other unified command. Insufficient Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and Real Property Maintenance (RPM) allocations exacerbates our already excessive facility maintenance backlog—with no relief expected. Unfortunately, our allocation of O&M and RPM funding has impacted our ability to maintain our infrastructure to the minimum level necessary for sustained operations. We continue to pursue infrastructure financing by all means available including the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP), Residual Value (RV) and Payment in Kind (PIK), and U.S. Congressional authorized and appropriated funding.

## **NATO Security Investment Program**

NSIP is a cost-sharing program for acquisition of common-use systems and equipment to which all NATO Allies contribute. It includes construction, upgrade and restoration of military facilities, and other related programs and projects required in support of NATO's new strategic concept, as well as new missions such as crisis management, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance. The program focuses on supporting mobile forces and providing command and control for crisis management. This program supports all NATO forces as well as the facilities and systems available to those forces.

NSIP provides NATO funding for agreed upon infrastructure projects. U.S. contributions make up about 26.3% of the total project cost. In exchange, we gain access to the resulting infrastructure and facilities through the Alliance.

During the past year we have been very successful in getting NSIP projects funded for U.S. installations, most notably Aviano Air Base, Italy; Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany; Lakenheath Air Base, United Kingdom; and Army War Reserve warehousing in the BENELUX region. In addition, NSIP continues to provide funding for vital projects in support of SFOR forces in the Bosnia operation. NSIP is cost-effective for the U.S. and provides a clear example of how we can work with and leverage our allies to provide infrastructure and facilities improvements for our troops.

## **Residual Value**

We continue to aggressively pursue payment for prior U.S. capital investment at installations returned to our NATO allies through the RV program. The amount of money we receive from RV programs has little to do with the amount originally invested; rather, proceeds are a function of current market conditions. Unfortunately, in many cases there is not much of a market for returned operational infrastructure such as ammo dumps and missile silos. Cash

settlements and PIK benefits recouped have been invested wisely in the infrastructure of enduring installations. Cash settlements augment RPM funds, but have not been nearly enough to offset the reduced funding levels we have experienced over the past few years. In Germany we have PIK, an active program to receive construction benefits in lieu of cash settlements for returned facilities. With a significant number of returns now settled, projections for future returns under this program are limited. We have already received \$320.1M of approximately \$500M we expect to receive from our original capital investment.

## CONCLUSION

Today, USEUCOM is smaller, leaner, and more heavily tasked than at any time in its history. Our men and women are stepping up to the challenge and performing magnificently in operations from Bosnia, to the southern tip of Africa, to the Middle East. The future offers hope and our recent successes are encouraging, but the world remains a very dangerous place. To meet future challenges, we must not let our current readiness and force structure erode. Our theater strategy is designed to prevent or limit conflict through active engagement while preserving the capability to respond to crises. ***Preventing a single conflict or major operation such as DESERT STORM or JOINT GUARD during any given year more than pays for all our engagement programs.***

We cannot ignore the opportunities presented by this unique period in history. Our troops remain the best trained and equipped forces in the world, but we must continue modernizing to retain our advantage. The drawdown in Europe is over. In areas such as Military Construction, Real Property Maintenance, family housing, and other Quality of Life programs, we must make up for past reductions and current budgets have started to do that. The lessons learned about a hollow military after World War I, World War II, the Korean Conflict, and Vietnam, must not be ignored now. The chance for conflict prevention has never been greater and we must seize the historic opportunity to sow the seeds of peace for our children and grandchildren.

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to address this committee, and I am extremely grateful for the support you have provided USEUCOM during the past year.